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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VoL. XXIII
YEAR INCOME TAXABLE-RESTRICTED SAVINGS
ACCOUNTS RECEIVED AS PART PAYMENT
The facts in three consolidated cases were substantially the same.'
The petitioners, two accrual basis corporate taxpayers and a man and
wife filing joint, cash basis tax returns, were engaged in the business of
selling houses. The purchasers of these houses were often unwilling or un-
able to pay the difference between the selling price and the amount of
money a mortgagee was legally allowed to loan (80 per cent of the lower of
the selling price or the appraised value of the house). To effect a sale un-
der these conditions the mortgagee, a savings and loan association, took a
note and a mortgage from the purchaser equal to the difference between
the amount of money paid as down payment by the purchaser and the
selling price of the house. The mortgagee, however, lent to the purchaser
only the amount of money legally allowable, with the purchaser, in turn,
paying this amount to the petitioners. At the same time, the mortgagee
delivered to the petitioners a savings account, or savings and loan shares
representing such an account,2 equal to the difference between the face of
the note and the cash loaned to the mortgagor-purchaser.
The petitioners, in the same transaction, assigned back the savings
account or shares to the mortgagee as additional security for the pur-
chaser's note. The terms of the assignment required that funds be re-
leased to the petitioners at the rate of $100 for each $200 paid by the
purchaser on the principal of his note. The court found the savings ac-
count or shares to be restricted rather than unrestricted at the time of
sale.A While the mortgage was not in default, the savings and loan asso-
ciation paid interest to the petitioners on the account or shares at the
same rate as was paid on unrestricted accounts or shares. On default the
petitioners could assume the purchaser's obligation on the note and take
over the property or could allow the balance of the account or shares
standing as security for the purchaser's note to be forfeited and applied
against the loan principal, in which case the petitioners were not further
liable. A savings account, or shares established for a loan, secured the
payment of only the one loan with respect to which the account or shares
were created, and could not be applied against a balance owing on another
loan.
1. There is substantial precedent for consolidation of similar cases, especially where two
parties are represented by the same attorney. See, Commerce Clearing House, WHEN You Go
To THE TAX COURT-PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 117 (1967).
2. The parties stipulated that there was no difference in procedure or substance between
the receipt of a savings account and shares representing such an account.
3. Since it was admitted that the savings and loan association gave unrestricted accounts
or shares to the petitioners, who immediately assigned them back in the same transaction, the
court, by finding that petitioners received restricted accounts or shares, recognized that the
transaction would not be consummated without a previous understanding that the reassign-
ment would occur; thus the accounts or shares were restricted eo instanti.
CASES NOTED
Each of the petitioners reported the restricted accounts or shares on
their tax returns as deferred income, not includible in gross income in the
year of sale, but includible only as accounts were released by payments
on the principal by the purchaser. The petitioners did not maintain bad
debt reserves and took no bad debt deduction if an account or shares
were forfeited. The court found that the savings accounts and shares
were neither easily negotiable nor freely bought and sold in commerce.'
Held, an accrual basis taxpayer is required to include in gross income the
face amounts of savings accounts or shares when received, but a cash
basis taxpayer is not. Western Oaks Building Corporation v. Commis-
sioner, 49 T.C. 365 (January 22, 1968).'
Prior to 1959, The Courts of Appeals were sharply divided on the is-
sue of whether reserve accounts which were not accessible to an accrual
basis taxpayer and which had an element of uncertainty as to the amount
ultimately to be received were includible in income before such accounts
were actually released to the taxpayer.6 Most of the decisions which had
held that the withheld reserve was not includible in income did so on the
theory that the transaction was a single, "three-cornered" one whereby a
dealer agreed to sell property and a purchaser agreed to borrow the pur-
chase price from a finance company directing its payment to the dealer,
but with the proviso that the finance company could retain a portion of
the loan as security.7
So viewing the transaction, those courts held that the dealer ac-
quired merely a contingent right to receive the amounts withheld
by the finance company and that such amounts were not taxable
to the dealer until they were received."
Additional rationale for exclusion from income was based on the proposi-
tion that the right to an amount is not accruable until the right to receive
an amount certain is fixed. "Otherwise, [a taxpayer] would be required to
pay a tax on income which he might never have a right to receive. ' '
4. Testimony by an officer of the savings and loan association to the effect that "[y]ou
might go for months and not hear anything about a savings account being sold, and then
maybe in the next week * * * you will hear about two or three sales," appears to have
satisfied the court of the restricted exchangeability of the accounts or shares. Western Oaks
Bldg. Corp., 49 T.C. 365, 377 (1968).
5. Neither the taxpayers nor the Commissioner appealed this decision. However, the
Commissioner entered a non-acquiescence to the extent of the decision relative to the cash
basis taxpayers. 1968 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 35, at 6 (August 26, 1968).
6. Decisions that the amounts in reserve must be included in income were: Baird v.
Comm'r, 256 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1958); and Schaeffer v. Comm'r, 258 F.2d 861 (6th Cir.
1958). Decisions that the amounts in reserve were not taxable until released were: Glover v.
Comm'r, 253 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1958); Hansen v. Comm'r, 258 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1958);
Johnson v. Comm'r, 233 F.2d 952 (4th Cir. 1956) ; and Texas Trailercoach, Inc. v. Comm'r,
251 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1958). In addition, the Tax Court had consistently held that the
reserve amounts were includible. Cf. Shoemaker-Nash, Inc., 41 B.T.A. 417 (1940).
7. Texas Trailercoach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1958).
8. Western Oaks Building Corp., 49 T.C. 365, 374 (1968).
9. Johnson v. Comm'r, 233 F.2d 952, 956 (4th Cir. 1956).
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Those decisions holding that the reserve was includible in income
did so by relying on the often-quoted definition of accrual basis tax ac-
counting:
Keeping accounts and making returns on the accrual basis, as
distinguished from the cash basis, import that it is the right to
receive and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion
of the amount in gross income. When the right to receive
becomes fixed, the right accrues.1 °
Furthermore, in at least one instance the Tax Court did not consider
material the question of whether the transaction was to be regarded as a
single transaction (three-cornered) or as two separate transactions."
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court decided the issue.' 2
In so doing, the Court heard three cases involving dealer sales and con-
current discounts with finance companies of notes made payable by pur-
chasers to the dealers, in which the finance companies "held back" a
percentage as security for the notes. The taxpayers in those cases argued
that the substance of the transaction was that of a three-cornered deal,
and that therefore there was only a future right to an undeterminable
amount rather than a fixed, ascertainable claim to the reserve at the time
of the sale or holdback. (It is generally agreed that a taxpayer is under
no obligation to pay a tax on income he might never receive.'") The Court
held that the transaction had to be viewed in two steps, viz., a sale of the
property followed by a sale of the note. The facts were clear that the
taxpayers had acquired the notes from the purchasers and, in turn, dis-
counted them with the finance companies.' 4
10. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Comm'r, 292 U.S. 182, 184 (1934).
11. Key Homes, Inc., 30 T.C. 109 (1958), aff'd, 271 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1959).
12. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
13. North American Oil Consolidated v. Comm'r, 286 U.S. 417 (1932). (But the "fact
that there is always the possibility that a purchaser or debtor may default in his obligation
is not sufficient to defer the accruing of income that has been earned." First Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 40 T.C. 474, 487 (1963)).
14. In Texas Trailercoach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.2d 395, 404 (5th Cir. 1958), the tax-
payer was actually engaged in a three-cornered transaction since the note was made payable
to the finance company. The court said:
It may well be, in another case, that a dealer's sale of a trailer to an individual pur-
chaser may be a complete and separate transaction; that, thereafter, the dealer may
discount the purchaser's note or sell the purchase contract to a bank or finance
company in a distinct and separate transaction; and, that, because of no intervening
conditions or few restrictions on the dealer's reserve, amounts in a dealer's reserve
account may be accruable to the dealer when withheld. Here, however, the financing
agreement between Texas Trailercoach, Inc. and Minnehoma made the trailer sale
and its financing one transaction. Minnehoma played a vital part in the transaction
from the incipiency of each trailer sale. Minnehoma controlled each sale, passed
on the credit risk, furnished the printed form, dictated the terms of each trailer
sale, and was specifically designated as the party to receive the unpaid balance. As
far as the trailer purchaser knew or cared about the transaction, his dealings were
with Minnehoma from the moment the sale was executed. In a real sense Minne-
homa extended its credit to the trailer purchasers, and purchased the trailer contractsfor the trailer purchasers, at least to the same extent that Bancredit Corporation
"merely discounted notes for applicators" in Keasbey & Mattison v. Commissioner.
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In the later case of Key Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner,'5 an accrual
basis taxpayer was engaged in the business of building and selling houses.
In connection with the sale of homes which required financing, the tax-
payer agreed to deposit a certain amount in a savings account to be held
as additional security for loans made to the taxpayer's customers. The
savings accounts thus created earned interest, but were restricted until
such time as the mortgages they secured were satisfied. It was held, on
the basis of Hansen v. Commissioner,1 6 that the mere contingency of ulti-
mate receipt was not sufficient to cause deferral of income to an accrual
basis taxpayer.
In the instant case, the accrual basis petitioners maintained that the
decision in Key Homes, Inc. was affirmed by misplacing reliance on the
Hansen decision in that the transactions involved in Key Homes, Inc.
(and in the instant case) were more nearly analogous to the three-cornered
transaction of Texas Trailercoach, Inc. v. Commissioner." But it would
appear that in Key Homes, Inc., by the wording of the agreement between
the financing institution and the taxpayer,1 8 the savings accounts were
created by the taxpayer's deposit after receipt of the total loan proceeds,
much as would be the case in a separate-step transaction similar to the
Hansen case. Furthermore, as the court pointed out, the Hansen decision
was not based on the question of whether the transaction was a single,
three-cornered transaction or two separate transactions, but on whether
the amounts retained by the finance company would ultimately be either
received by the dealer or used to satisfy the obligations of the dealer."'
It was held that they would be so used and, therefore, the dealer's right
to receive was fixed. It was immaterial that because of future contingen-
The practical effect of Minnehoma being a party to the transaction from the
beginning, is that the taxpayer did not receive the full sales price or its equivalent
from the purchaser.
However, the court appeared, in large part, to base its decision of non-includibility of the
reserve on the fact that the finance company could charge the taxpayer's reserve with items
unrelated to the sale of trailers, thus making ultimate collection and present value all the
more speculative.
15. 271 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1959), aff'g, 30 T.C. 109 (1958).
16. 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
17. 251 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1958). The Tax Court had clearly indicated in Key Homes,
Inc. that it was immaterial whether the transaction was a three-cornered one or two sepa-
rate transactions. However, the Tax Court case on appeal ante-dated the decision in Com-
missioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959), and the difference between the two methods was
of significance in guiding the decisions of the courts of appeals at that time. It so happens
that the Sixth Circuit was sympathetic with the Commissioner's view of taxability of with-
held reserve funds prior to its affirmation of Key Homes, Inc. See Schaeffer v. Comm'r, 258
F.2d 861 (1958). The Court, therefore, would probably have affirmed even without the
Hansen decision.
18. 30 T.C. 109, 110 (1958).
19. See, Guarantee Title and Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 313 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1963) and
Etheridge and Vanneman, Inc., 40 T.C. 461 (1963), which distinguished Hansen by holding
that amounts credited to reserve accounts of the accrual basis taxpayers were not includible
in income since the right to receive the income was contingent upon the happening of a
future event, which event would not alter any of the taxpayers' legal obligations.
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
cies the dealer might never receive the amount of the reserve in cash,
since it would otherwise be applied in discharge of the dealer's legal
obligations. ° The rationale of Key Homes, Inc. has been widely ac-
cepted.2'
The question persists in cases similar to the one under discussion:
how will a taxpayer know how much tax to pay, if his tax is computed on
income which he has not yet actually reduced to possession? The plain
fact is that such a dilemma is a normal result of the accrual basis of ac-
counting. The alternative would be to permit accrual basis taxpayers to
escape taxation in a particular year by permitting portions of their sales
to be retained by buyers or agents. To maintain the necessary order in
income taxation, accrual basis taxpayers must, under ordinary circum-
stances, be accountable for taxes computed on their income as determined
at the moment of sale, i.e., when the right to the income arises.22
The intent of Congress, as embodied in the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, is to assess a tax based upon taxable income computed in ac-
cordance with acceptable methods of tax accounting. The concept is
basically simple: income must be taxed at the proper time. Recognizing
that different business conditions require different accounting techniques,
some latitude is provided by allowing the adoption of different methods
of accounting.23 At the same time, 4reat discretion has been accorded the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in requiring a method of accounting
which clearly reflects income.24 It is obvious that if it is held that only
accrual basis reporting is appropriate in the case of transactions where
reserves for collateral are retained by third parties, the marginal operator
will be unable to operate a business which requires such holdbacks. Thus,
while a taxpayer has the right to elect the accrual method of accounting
and should pay taxes on accrued income regardless of whether or not it
is received, he should also be given the opportunity to reduce his taxable
income to an amount which is more in line with what could reasonably be
expected to be a fair measure of accrued income, by taking as a deduction
a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts which may arise out of
20. Payment of the legal obligation of a taxpayer constitutes taxable income. Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
21. Bolling v. Comm'r, 357 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Wood, 352 F.2d
522 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Lewis Building & Supplies, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 244 (1966);
Warren G. Morris, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 660 (1963); Carl B. Holland, 22 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 504 (1963). See also Gallagher Realty Co., 4 B.T.A. 219, 222-23 (1926) where it is
said that
[t]he fact that a portion of the purchase price . . . was assigned or left in the hands
of the building association to insure mortgage payments by the purchaser and that
the actual payment to the taxpayer was deferred does not . . . justify the taxpayer
in excluding these amounts from income when it kept its books on the accrual
basis. [Emphasis added.]
22. TREAS. REG. § 1.451-1(a) provides that "[u]nder an accrual method of accounting,
income is includible in gross income when all the events have occurred which fix the right
to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."
23. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 446(c).
24. Id., § 446(b).
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his liability as guarantor, endorser, or indemnitor of debt obligations aris-
ing from sale by him of property.25
Shortly after the decision in Hansen was handed down, the Courts
of Appeals (but not the Tax Court) began recognizing the taxpayers'
need for measuring income in a manner which would also result in avail-
ability of funds with which to pay income taxes. 6 This was done by allow-
ing bad debt reserve additions equal to the amount of the holdback
reserves. The reasonableness of this addition was justified theoretically
by reference to the large dollar volume of outstanding loans being guar-
anteed. Because of the controversy between the Tax Court and the Courts
of Appeals in this area, the Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1966
to provide that a reasonable reserve addition for guaranteed debts could
be taken as a deduction by a dealer in property."
But instead of proving reasonable additions to a reserve for bad
debts, should a dealer be allowed to adopt the cash basis of reporting in-
come and thereby avoid tax on holdback reserves? Interestingly enough,
the decision in Western Oaks Building Corp., to the effect that cash basis
taxpayers did not have to include the unreceived holdback reserves in
income, did not turn on whether such taxpayers employed a proper
method of accounting, but upon the nature of the document evidencing
their interest in the holdback reserves. Cases where the Commissioner
has invoked his broad powers under Section 446 (b) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code are legion,2 but there is little case law directly related to this
issue with respect to a dealer's reserves. In one case, the Commissioner
forced the dealer to use the accrual basis method although, according to
the court's findings, he had consistently used a cash method. The court
held that the forced accrual of income by the Commissioner was im-
proper, erroneous, and illegal. 9
25. Id., § 166(c).
26. Boiling v. Comm'r, 357 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1966); Foster Frosty Foods, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 332 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1964); Wilkens Pontiac v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1961).
27. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 166(g). Although this may solve the problem for the
great majority of accrual basis taxpayers, it should be emphasized that the provision is
applicable only to dealers in property. Thus a loan broker who guarantees debts for a fee
and who thus allows holdback reserves to stand as security may not use the reserve method
of providing for bad..debts. Budget Credits, Inc., 50 T.C. No. 8 (April 15, 1968). Although
this decision is currently on appeal by the taxpayer, it does not seem likely to be reversed
in view of the clear statutory language and intent evidenced by S. REP. No. 1710, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Furthermore, although no reference is made to a case involving a
non-dealer, the dissenting opinion to the effect that all prior litigation which gave rise to the
controversy over bad debt reserve additions in this area dealt with dealers is not completely
accurate. Family Budget Service, Inc. v. United States, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f1 9151 (S.D.
Miss. Nov. 20, 1963).
28. E.g., American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) ; Automobile Club
of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957) ; Schlude v. Comm'r, 372 U.S. 128 (1963);
United States v. Catto, 344 F.2d 227 (1965) ; Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc., 47 T.C. 139
(1966).
29. Dalton & Ely Motor Co. v. United States, 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. fT 9589 (E.D. Ky.
July 10, 1961), rev'd, by stipulation of the parties, 62-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. f 9650 (6th Cir.
June 29, 1962).
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On the other hand, it is well established that where inventories are
a material factor in computing income, the accrual basis of accounting
must be used with respect to purchases and sales of such inventory. As
was stated in Johnson v. Commissioner,3
0
But inventories were an essential part of taxpayer's accounting,
and for that reason if for no other, his reporting would necessar-
ily have to be on an accrual basis. (Treas. Regs. § 1.446-1(c)
(2)); Herberger v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 293, 295, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 820. Moreover, under [Sec. 446(b)] of the
Internal Revenue Code of [1954], . . . the Commissioner was
justified in revising and restating taxpayer's accounts in order
clearly to reflect his income.
If it can be assumed that inventories are a material factor in deter-
mining a dealer's income, then it follows that the dealer should probably
use the accrual basis and would have to rely on a bad debt reserve addi-
tion to ease his tax burden. But if it is assumed that inventories are not
a material factor in determining income (and such an assumption does
not appear to be totally unreasonable), or if the issue involves a broker
or other type of non-dealer who has funds withheld in connection with
his business transactions, the question then becomes whether such with-
held funds will be subjected to taxation notwithstanding their inaccessi-
bility to the taxpayer.
Clearly, even a cash basis taxpayer is entitled to use the reserve
method of accounting for bad debts if he is a dealer in property and has
recognized income with respect to an account.3 ' Again, if this were the
case, he could mitigate his tax problems by means of reasonable bad debt
reserve additions. But assuming, arguendo, that no such reserve method
is available to a dealer, and considering especially the non-dealer where
no reserve method is permitted, it is submitted that the taxpayer should
not be taxed on funds over which he has no command.
The Commissioner has consistently maintained that any evidence of
indebtedness received by a cash basis taxpayer is taxable as the receipt of
cash. In asserting taxability, the Commissioner will usually rely on the
concepts of either constructive receipt,82 equivalence of cash,3 or eco-
nomic benefit,3 4 in addition to the requirement of clearly reflecting income.
30. 233 F.2d 952, 956 (4th Cir. 1956).
31. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 17 B.T.A. 1358 (1929).
32. United States v. Britt, 335 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1964) ; George W. Drysdale, 32 T.C.
378 (1959), rev'd, 277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1960); Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523
(5th Cir. 1955) ; Ottilie B. Kuehner, 20 T.C. 875 (1953), aff'd, 214 F.2d 437 (1954).
33. Rhodes v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 894 (W.D.S.C. 1965); Drysdale v. Comm'r,
277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1960), rev'g 32 T.C. 378 (1959) ; E.T. Sproull, 16 T.C. 244 (1951),
aff'd, 194 F.2d 541 (1952); REV. RuL. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 174, 177-78; REV. RUL.
62-74, 1962-1 Cum. BULL. 68; REV. RUL. 67-203, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 105.
34. J.D. Amend, 13 T.C. 178 (1949) (can also be read as a constructive receipt case)
Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935), Estate of Clarence W. Ennis, 23 T.C. 799
(1955); Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 463 (1951); Sam F. McIntosh, CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1967-
230 (1967).
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In this regard, the taxpayer has frequently suffered under the economic
benefit allegati6n where a sum certain receivable in the future is ascer-
tained.
In the final analysis, however, despite the Commissioner's persis-
tence, most courts do not tax the cash basis taxpayer unless he has
received cash or a freely negotiable instrument, or has freely turned away
from acceptance of cash or its equivalent, e.g., a readily negotiable instru-
ment which could be converted to cash in order to pay the related income
taxes.
A long line of "escrow cases," called such because they involve the
use of escrowed or restricted funds which are not certain as to ultimate
amount or time of receipt, has reflected the courts' reluctance to tax cash
basis taxpayers who, in concurrent or related transactions, place the cash
out of their reach for bona fide business purposes.8 5
In summary, it is not contended that an accrual basis taxpayer
should not report income on withheld reserves, since his method of ac-
counting requires recognition of such income. On the other hand, recog-
nizing business exigencies, the courts and the Commissioner should be
agreeable to the admission of bad debt reserve additions of reasonable
amounts by dealers in property. And, certainly, where the cash basis
method of accounting is permitted because the use of inventories does not
require some other method, the Commissioner should surrender his losing
battle of trying to tax inaccessible cash. His attempts to do so are neither
reconcilable with business transaction requirements nor consistent with
proper revenue-raising methods.
OLIVER C. MURRAY, JR.
35. William 0. Anderson, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 697 (1961); Marion H. McArdle, 11
T.C. 961 (1948); Preston R. Bassett, 33 B.T.A. 182 (1935), af'd per curiam, 90 F.2d
1004 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Margaret L. Carpenter, 34 T.C. 408 (1960) ; Julian Robertson, 6 T.C.
1060 (1946) ; C. E. Gullett, 31 B.T.A. 1067 (1935). An indication of the courts' attitude in
taxing withheld- reserves of cash. basis taxpayers is found in a well-reasoned escrow case.
In Charles M. Kilborn, 29 T.C. 102 (1957), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Hine Pontiac,
360 U.S. 715 (1959), it was held that a taxpayer using inventories must compute his income
on the accrual basis. Accordingly, the court said,
[it is] unnecessary to consider and decide whether the amounts credited to a col-
lateral reserve account, in circumstances such as we have here, would or would not
constitute realized income to a cash basis taxpayer. See however, Luther Bonham, 33
B.T.A. 1100, aff'd 89 F.2d 725. Id. at 109, 110.
In the Bonham case, which the court implies it will follow if confronted with a
cash basis holdback reserve situation, the court held that the amount in escrow was taxable
to the cash basis taxpayer only because there was no condition on the ultimate receipt of
the full amount, and that if there had been contingencies no tax would be assessed until
cash was received or the contingencies expired.
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